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I. BACKGROUND.
CASS.20/82
In terms of the present South African government policy of separate development, 
the ’’national states” or ’’homelands” for the various linguistic and ethnic 
groups among black (African) South Africans are expected or anticipated to 
move from their present constitutional status of limited self-government to a 
final stage of sovereign independence. Once independent, the citizens of 
these territories obviously lose the legitimacy of their claims to full 
citizenship, franchise rights and associated privileges in the common area of 
South African society. Given that these areas comprise the least-developed 
parts of the country, are very small in size relevative to the populations ex­
pected to live in or identify with them, and can provide employment for only 
very small proportions of their working-age adults, the prospect of con­
stitutional and civic separation from the developed core of South African 
society cannot hold much attraction for the people involved, with the exception, 
perhaps of a small minority of entrepeneurs and civil servants for whom 
independence can mean enhanced prospects for advancement.
Furthermore, the constitutional dispensation granted to the homeland areas also 
weakens the claims to full citizenship rights of those blacks who in terms of 
the policy are associated with an ethnic homeland but who live permanently in 
the common area of the country. It is among the black people in the major 
industrial complexes that resistance to the separation of the homelands is most 
frequently articulated.
The stark reality of the economic interdependence of the white and black areas 
is countered by the central government policy-makers with proposals for a 
confederal relationship between the homelands and the central state. The con­
federal association would provide for consultation and joint decision-making 
on matters of common concern to the territories. Obviously, however, the 
basic constitutional mould would have been set and the weaker black states in 
the confederacy would have little chance of negotiating benefits and rights for 
their citizens in the core areas of the countiy; it stands to reason that the 
central government would not grant rights and privileges which the constitutional 
separation was designed to avoid in the first place.
Nevertheless, four such homelands have already accepted independence, without 
any manifest coercion on the part of the South African government. The attrac­
tions of full scope for local business and political initiative have proved to 
be too attractive for the elite groups in some of the areas to withstand. It 
is also very probable that other homelands will follow suit in due course.
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Among the homelands that have not accepted the principle of independence is 
KwaZulu. KwaZulu has a particular significance. It is the officially designated 
political home of the largest of the black ethnic groups; the largest single 
linguistic category in South Africa in fact. It is also the most fragmented of 
the territories, comprising over 30 blocs of land distributed throughout the 
Province of Natal. The most far-reaching of the government proposals for con­
solidation will only reduce it to ten blocs, and that at mammoth expense. The 
Zulu people are also by tradition the most cohesive and determined, and least 
tractable group among South Africa1s black people. Therefore, the policy of 
separate development cannot achieve final success without the cooperation of the 
Zulu people, but with KwaZulu, the policy faces its sternest V  . 
test.
The Chief Minister of KwaZulu, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, is a very different type 
of leader to those in the other homelands. He does not preside over a small, 
co-opted or "comprador" elite but, partly outside of his formal status, is 
President of Inkatha Yenkululeko Yesizwe, the nearly hOO 000-strong mobilisation 
organisation which is the largest organised political body in the history of 
black politics in South Africa. As such, Inkatha represents an organised 
constituency which sanctions its leaders; even if Buthelezi were to be tempted 
by the blandishments of Pretoria his constituency would have at least equal 
influence on any outcome.
Against this background, and also against a background of rejection by industrial 
leaders in Natal of government attempts to plan for the consolidation of KwaZulu 
as a prelude to independence, Chief Buthelezi and his government decided to act 
in an attempt to resolve the constitutional impasse, by appointing a Commission 
of Enquiry into KwaZulu and the "white" area so intertwined with it - Natal.
The significance of the action was heightened by the government's omission of 
blacks from its own White, Coloured and Indian constitutional planning body, the 
President's Council.
The Buthelezi Commission,then, is essentially a black initiative to attempt to 
give direction to the constitutional debate in South Africa, as it affects one 
of the most important regions of the country. While a black initiative, the 
Commission was fully non-racial, with its members appointed for expertise and 
representativeness. The Chairman was white, Professor Deneys Schreiner, Vice 
Principal of the University of Natal. The governing National Party refused to 
serve, however.
*
3.
The latter fact made it imperative for the Commission to achieve the greatest 
possible validity and credibility in the evidence which it considered. This 
was particularly important since there is very little agreement among politicians 
and observers as to what degree of social, racial and constitutional reform 
whites are prepared to accept. Similarly9 observers disagree widely among each 
other as to the compatibility of black and white values, political sentiments 
and current expectations. Only through focused attitude research can one 
attempt to resolve the contradictory views.
Accordingly, the Buthelezi Commission requested the author to design and con- 
tract out research in order to:
- determine the extent of support among blacks and whites for current 
policies;
- establish the extent to which blacks and whites would be prepared to com­
promise on their ideal demands on political accommodation in the region;
- assess the extent to which the basic political, social and economic outlooks 
of the different groups in the region are compatible;
- and to establish in the light of current political and social consciousness 
among black South Africans, the degree of urgency with which a new dispensa­
tion should be sought.
The attitude surveys covered 525 whites, 200 Indians and 100 Coloureds in Natal 
and 2 629 black people in KwaZulu, Natal and the Witwatersrand. The results 
compliment the other evidence collected by the Commission in that they collected 
responses in an atmosphere of neutrality in peopled homes away from the 
atmosphere of the Commission proceedings.
The main fieldwork was conducted by a well-known commercial organisation^ with
a sound reputation for high quality fieldwork using inter-related quota samples
based on random interviewing points. People were interviewed at length by
well-trained permanent staff who had no particular interest in the Commission’s
findings. A check on white responses was run through a second well-known
2)polling organisation with a reputation for accurate voting forecasts. The 
Commission accepted the results as sufficiently objective and unbiased to 
adequately reflect the political climate. If the results err, they would tend 
to be more conservative than what would be expected in a ’’live” political 12
1) IMS. S.A. (Pty) Ltd.
2) Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd.
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situation, due to the fact that South Africans tend to respond cautiously to 
controversial questions when they do not have the benefit of guidance from 
political leadership arid public debate. Some of the major findings are summarised 
below. The results are presented without comment and certain conclusions are 
drawn at the end of a series of findings. The interview schedule items below 
are shortened and paraphrased.
H .  BLACK POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS.
2.1 SCALE OF HAPPINESS TO ANGER AND IMPATIENCE WITH LIFE IN SOUTH AFRICA.
A five point scale of feelings about "life in South Africa today" with 
descriptions ranging from "very happy" to "angry and impatient", associated 
with pictures of faces on a diagram was administered to black respondents 
in these surveys and also in 1977P  The same interviewers and sample design 
were enployed. The percentages of the comparable samples of black people 
who expressed "Anger and Impatience" with life in South Africa for 1977 
and 1981 are as follows:
"Anger and Impatience"
39%Witwatersrand,! lg?7 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
A l l  I 56%
Black Males 1981 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
" .. 1 I ’ 1 oaI4....... ......
Witwatersrand 
and KwaZulu, 
Zulu Men
1977
1981
"“Iff
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
53%
0*0. Qf QrCL €L Oa 0*0* 0*0. 0*0.0.0*0.0.0* 0* 0* &0* Q.0* 0* 0*0* 0*0* 0.VVVVvVVVVVVVvVVV'QVTÍVTOTyvVVVVVlïTÏ
i
Better educated 45%
Witwatersrand, 1977 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
and KwaZulu 
Men 1981
68%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
1) See Theodor Hanf et al. South Africa: Prospects for Peaceful Change,
London: Rex Collings, 1981.
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A breakdown of results for social categories.in KwaZulu/Natal is as 
follows:
"Anger and Impatience” - 1981
All KwaZulu/Natal
KwaZulu
Metropolitan
Small Town
Rural
Male
Female
45%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
45%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
56%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
50%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
40%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Youth - 18 - 24 
years
48%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
High education, 65%
Form 5 or more %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
White collar 
workers
55%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Skilled/semi- 
skilled manual 
workers
49%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2.2 DEMONSTRATION EFFECT OF MR. MUGABE'S VICTORY IN ZIMBABWE.
It must be assumed that events in Zimbabwe have influenced black political 
consciousness in South Africa. The following results are relevant.
"Mugabe could not have won against South African White army" 
Percentage agreement with statement.
KwaZulu/Natal
cities
Witwat ers rand %%%%%%%%
"Mugabe's men won because of their own strength and courage"
KwaZulu/N atal 
cities
83%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
83%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%Witwatersrand
62.3 POLITICAL CAUTION VS, ACTIVISM IN SENTIMENTS.
A general indication of the extent of militancy of sentiment in the 
black population appears from the following series of results;
"It is best for black South Africans to be careful in Politics and 
not get into trouble”
KwaZulu/Natal
cities:
Agree
Disagree
Witwatersrand: 
Agree
Disagree
45%
54%
"If the government does not introduce changes for blacks in the next 
10 years, which of the following do you expect?"_____________________
KwaZulu/Natal 
cities s______
"Definitely Expect"
Blacks will be too 
frightened by arm// 9% 
police to act %%%%
Many more blacks 
will leave country
for military 56%
training %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Mass strikes by
black workers %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%'
(spontaneous addition)
Bloodshed/war/
revolution %%%%%%%%%'
98%
7Witwatersrand:
"definitely expect”
Blacks will be too 
frightened by army/ 17%
police to act %%%%%%%%%%
Many more blacks 
will leave country 
for military
training %%%%%%%%%%'
Mass strikes by
black workers %%%%%%%%%%!
51%
6*1%
%%
(spontaneous addition)
Bloodshed/war/
revolution %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%■
99%
a%%%
Rural KwaZulu::
"definitely expect”
Blacks will be too
frightened by army/ 21%
police to act %%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Many more blacks 
will leave country
for military 44%
training %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Mass strikes by 
black workers
60%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
(spontaneous addition)
Bloodshed/war/ 100%
revolution %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
2.4 POTENTIAL FELT SUPPORT FOR CONFRONTATION.
Items which are somewhat closer to attitudinal indices of possible behaviour, 
and not merely sentiment, are reflected in the following series.
"Would black workers strike for two weeks in response to a call by well- 
respected black leader?” ________
All KwaZulu/Natal: 20%
Almost all 
Many
Only a few
49%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
29%
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"If the ANC were to come in secretly asking people to help it and work 
with it... what would happen?"____________________________
(The ANC is a black political organisation banned in South Africa, which 
operates from an external mission abroad).
All Natal/KwaZulu:
Most would try 19%
to help %%%%%%%%%%%
Many would 
help it
A few
Nobody/almost 8%
nobody %%%%
"Most or many would help the ANC" (first and second categories above)
48%
All KwaZulu/Natal %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
46%
Rural %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Youth 56%
18-24 years %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%^. 9, a 9. e. 9, o. 9,9, a 9, a 9.
White collar 56%
workers %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%.0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,01,0,0,0,
Skilled/semi- 
skilled workers
55%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
"Of people who would not help the ANC, would it be because of fear of 
Police or because they disagreed with the ANC?"_____________________ _
All KwaZulu/Natal:
Fear of police %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
27%
Disagree with ANC %%%%%%%%%%%%%%
60%
2.5 RECOGNITION OF LEADERSHIP.
In KwaZulu-Natal Chief Buthelezi and his Inkatha move are dominantly 
recognised as the legitimate political leadership although the ANC is 
in a strong second place. On the Witwatersrand, the ANC has greatest 
recognition, followed by Black Consciousness organisations and then by 
Inkatha and the Soweto Committee of Ten. As an individual leader,
9 .
Chief Buthelezi is ahead of any other figures on the Witwatersrand 
except "absent" ANC leadership,.
2.6 WHAT THESE RESULTS SUGGEST:
These results show a growing verbal militancy, mounting political 
consciousness and increasing discontent at the political level. Other 
results not reported, however, show that this growing consciousness has 
not yet permeated the sphere of labour or trade-union issues for the 
rank-and-file, although this tendency obviously could develop quite 
easily from now on, given the apparent intensity of discontent.
The sharpening of the political consciousness is due in part to the 
fact that by now a large majority of black people actively compare their 
condition with that of whites, making for strong feelings of relative 
deprivation. The goal of equality is supplanting the goal of reform
and progress for blacks.
The following pattern of answers to one of the items bearing on this 
topic is illustrative of the trend:
"What would you prefer?":
Percentage choice -
all blacks - KwaZulu/Natal:
Black and white South Africans getting
the same salaries for the same jobs
but everyone getting very small
increases ____________________ ___________ 90%
Black and white salaries staying
unequal for some years but
everyone being given quite large
regular increases 10%
Despit? these trends it is not suggested that there is a pre-revolutionary 
situation in South Africa. Most of the radical sentiment derives from 
the symbolic effect of events elsewhere in Africa, particularly Zimbabwe. 
Nevertheless, there is a substantial minority of roughtly one-third of 
people which appears to be consistently militant and among that group 
a smaller minority the answers of which suggest militancy with intentions 
to act. Even if this latter group is no more than 10 percent of the
10.
total, and it could be as high as roughly 20 percent, it represents 
large numbers of people in absolute terms. It is not to be taken 
lightly.
Another consequence of the present-day political consciousness among 
blacks is the fact that popular sentiments increasingly justify, legitimate 
and encourage militant strategies and undermine internal leadership.
It would seem that socio-political reform of such a kind as to increase 
faith in the possibility of change is urgent. A situation has to be 
avoided in which only subversion and coercion are recognised as useful 
strategies by a majority.
Ill ATTITUDES TO THE SEPARATION AND INDEPENDENCE OF KWAZULU AMONG BLACKS 
AND WHITES.
3.1 INTERDEPENDENCE OF KWAZULU AND NATAL.
Both balcks and whites recognise the essential inderdependence of races 
and regions in KwaZulu-Natal. Among whites, this can be seen in 
responses to the following items.
"All races depend on and need each other”
Agreement:
68%
All whites
Afrikaans-
speakers
61%
"Separation of KwaZulu and Natal can last indefinitely"
Agreement;
15%
All whites
Afrikaans-
speakers
52%
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3.2 INDEPENDENCE FOR KWAZULU.
In response to an interview item on whether or not "KwaZulu with 
territory in Natal from Mozambique and Swaziland to Transkei should 
become independent ", the following proportions considered that KwaZulu 
should become an independent country:
All whites 32% 
Afrikaners 49% 
Afrikaans National Party 59% 
English National Party 39% 
NRP 20% 
Businessmen 25% 
Indians 22% 
Coloureds 15% 
Blacks - all KwaZulu/Natal 27%
Hence it is only among one section of National Party supporters that 
independence is endorsed. Thus, majorities in all official ethnic 
groups reject the concept of independence as normally envisaged for 
National States. Those supporting independence are generally least 
inclined to wish to see additional territory or concessions for KwaZulu. 
While conservative whites value the segregation implied by Separate 
Development, the full implications of government policy are not accepted.
IV ALTERNATIVES TO PRESENT POLICIES.
4.1 MODIFIED INDEPENDENCE.
Between 50 percent and 70 percent of blacks are prepared to accept the 
possibility of independence if either more farming land or towns and 
cities are added to KwaZulu, or if independence implies the right to 
live and work outside KwaZulu. This cannot be taken as support for 
modified versions of Separate Development as a policy, since the 
modifications are such as to defeat the political goals of independence 
as conceived by the present government. The real reaction to a separate 
and autonomous KwaZulu alienated from the common society, is seen in 
the following result for blacks:
12.
"KwaZulu should not exist - it should be part of Natal and South Africa" 
Agreement among blacks;
The factors which encourage black people to endorse a modified 
"independence" are not connected with the independence as such but 
the new opportunities suggested - access to farming land9to towns $ 
to cities and the right to work in South Africa.
Among whites and other minorities, the prospect of independence with 
the kinds of benefits which might persuade blacks to accept it, is 
unnacceptable to majorities:
"If political problems became severe with pressure to grant 
concessions..«would you accept homelands like KwaZulu encouraged 
into independence with more land, towns and industries"?
Acceptance:
All Natal whites 44%
Afrikaans National Party 44%
English-speaking National 
Party 47%
Bus ine s smen 3 8 %
Indians 58%
Coloureds 52%
Broadly, however, what blacks desire to make independence acceptable is 
the negation of reasons for separation in the first place, and the 
concrete implications of these desires are rejected by slight to 
substantial minorities of whites.
4.2 "CONSENSUS" ALTERNATIVES.
Our results indicate that there is a very real prospect of sufficient 
agreement at grass-roots level being achieved on constitutional options 
for the region to make a devolution of power to a conjoint Natal/KwaZulu
Natal-KwaZulu cities 
KwaZulu rural 
Soweto Zulu
Zulu migrants in Transvaal
82%
72%
73%
65%
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSENSUS AND DISSENT
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PERCENTAGE LEVEL OF ACCEPTANCE BY GROUPS 
B=Black(Zulu), C=Co1oureds, I=Indians, W=White$
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Natal and KwaZulu as they are but cooperating more in planning development
<Dest* © ©
CONSENSUS REJECTION
©
KwaZjlu independent along lines qf Transkei/Bophuthatswana etc. 
Leaving KwaZulu as it is.
© ®Q ®
est.
Natal and KwaZulu one Government under Pretoria - Black Representatives increasing over years until equal in number
O ©  ©  © e s t .
CONSENSUS ACCEPTANCE
MAJORITIES OR NEAR MAJORITIES__________
Bringing together KwaZulu/Natal round large pities - multiracial - equal rights for all
©  ©  ©(gj.
Natal and KwaZulu unified - full movement for all - multiracial Govt, under Pretoria - Local Flower
0© © ©
Natal and KwaZulu allowed by Government to uhite - power-sharing on 50/50 basis to make many l^ iws for the region.
© O  ©  ^
KwaZulu and Natal joining with powers to makfe some laws - central government retaining some po
o
Yer.
Elected Homeland leaders and White Governmen
Qualified franchise for Blacks.
sharing decisions on a 50/50 Basis on Governing©
© ©© ©
KwaZulu Government, Pretoria and Natal cominjj together to make decisions for big towns, cities© © ® ©
Black Homeland leaders, Black Urban Representatives on a governing council with White Cabinet
©  ©  ©  ©
dunci1,
and surrounding areas
Universal franchise for South Africa with WnteyMÏnority veto rights
© ©m m
One-man-one Vote in a single system for South Africa.
Q> ©  © ©
* Note: Market and Opinion Surveys (Pty) Ltd. results are used since they had more realistic acceptance categories
"If government supports proposals"
Note: Where figures are estimated (est.) a closely comparable item is taken as a basis.
V
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an achievable political goal for any political party, excluding only 
the right-wing opposition to the present government. Eht schedule 
of "Consensus-Dissent" which follows illustrates this. Among some 
party-supporters - mainly National Party supporting Afrikaners, 
considerable leadership will be required to sell the policy, but the 
majority agreement among whites generally will encourage movement 
among government supporters. Majority agreement on a political 
devolution for KwaZulu-Natal may not be immediately forthcoming from 
National Party supporters but the Commission foresees the possibility 
of considerable movement with adequate leadership over the next few years.
4.3 COMPATIBILITY OF POLITICAL CULTURES.
Finally the results of the attitude surveys indicate that, despite 
much popular wisdom in South Africa suggesting that black and white 
political cultures are incompatible, the black respondents, no matter 
how they were questioned, revealed basic political values which appear 
to be remarkably close to those of whites. Considering the distorting 
effect of great inequality in circumstances, it is surprising that so 
slight a basic ideological cleavage exists between blacks and whites.
The studies show, for example that majorities in all races support 
the free market economy, the principle of opposition in politics, the 
protection of civil liberties within the constraints of maintaining law 
and order and most importantly the need to protect the legitimate 
interests of minority ethnic groups. The results suggest quite strongly 
that what divides people in South Africa are social structures more than 
the sentiments and attitudes of ordinary people. This feature of the 
results supports the Commissions final proposals for a move toward the 
unification of KwaZulu and Natal autonomous but not independent of 
South Africa, with an internal dispensation based on universal ' 
franchise,. proportional representation in an all-race legislative
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